This paper studies the question of optimal licensing contract in a leadership structure when the patent holder is a non-producer. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder has three alternative licensing strategies, viz., fee, royalty and auction. We show that when the innovation is small, royalty dominates other contracts. But for larger innovations while fee dominates royalty, auction is the equilibrium decision. Depending on the size of the innovation the license is given either to leader or to follower or to both. Hence identity of the licensee becomes an important variable.
Introduction
An inventor while investing in R&D expects a return on its investment. Possibility of technology transfer increases its inventive incentives. One important issue in the literature of technology transfer is to study the question of optimal licensing contract from the perspective of the inventor or innovator. Broadly, there are three types of licensing contracts discussed in the literature, viz., auction, fee licensing and royalty licensing. However, all options may not always be equally available to the innovator. For instance, if imitation is easy and patent protection is imperfect, writing a royalty contract is often difficult.
1 On the other hand, technology transfer through auctioning is much less visible than other modes. There are some scattered evidences on the number of licensing contracts signed. For instance, the survey of firms by Rostoker (1984) shows that 39% of cases have royalty licensing alone, 13% have fee licensing alone, and 46% of cases have fee plus royalty contracts. To the study of the technology licensing contracts between Indian and foreign firms, Alam (1985) observes that lower royalty rates are associated with higher lump sum payments by the transferee.
2
What will be the optimal licensing contract from the perspective of the patent holder? It really depends on a number of factors. 3 Based on the assumptions of the model, the optimal decision will be royalty licensing, fee licensing or auction. 4 In the present paper we assume that the patent holder is a non-producer and the product market has leadership structure with one leader and one follower competing in quantities. Also there is no informational problem, and imitation of the licensed technology is not possible. The patent holder's problem then is to decide which contract is to be given and to whom.
A few comments on the assumption of the product market structure are in order. Theoretically speaking, what will be the structure of the product market is an assumption of the model builder. In the literature the product market is assumed to be monopoly, competitive or simultaneous move oligopoly. No work so far has considered the case of a leadership structure. 5 This paper is an attempt to fill up this gap. Moreover, in the real world there are a number of products the markets for which can be approximated as the leadership structures. Hence the model has also practical significance. With the assumption of the Stackelberg market structure we derive some results that are distinctly different from the existing ones. One may further note that in a leadership structure even if the competitors have identical production technologies, a move advantage (or disadvantage) makes the firms asymmetric. Then the identity of a potential licensee becomes an important consideration to the patent holder. In a simultaneous move game it obviously does not play any role. Below we briefly outline the literature so that we can pinpoint our contributions.
The literature starts with the contribution of Arrow (1962) . It discusses technology transfer by means of a royalty and shows that the patent holder derives a larger payoff from its transfer to a competitive firm than to a monopoly. Licensing in a competitive industry by means of both a fee and a royalty is discussed in Kamien and Tauman (1984) . These models however cannot capture the strategic interaction of the firms, which is the hallmark of an oligopoly industry. Hence a series of articles have come out in the literature recognizing this strategic interaction. A nice survey of this literature can be found in Kamien (1992) .
There are a number of articles that assume the patent holder to be a non-producer, an outsider to the product market. One important contribution is by Kamien and Tauman (1986) . Here the patent holder transfers its technology to an oligopoly by means of a fee or a royalty when the product market is Cournot or Bertrand with homogeneous goods. It shows that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and the consumers. On the other hand, Katz and Shapiro (1986) have studied licensing by means of an auction. Kamien et al. (1992) have extended these works to the class of a more general demand function and considered all three licensing strategies. Their paper shows that licensing by means of a royalty is inferior to other modes, and auction generally dominates fee licensing. Muto (1993) has a model of price competition with differentiated products. It portrays situations when royalty licensing dominates other forms of licensing.
On the other hand, Katz and Shapiro (1985) , Rockett (1990) and Wang (1998) model the case when the patent holder is directly a competitor in the product market. Katz and Shapiro (1985) study innovation incentives in the presence of the licensing opportunities and assume fee contract with the presumption that in the presence of imitation writing a royalty contract will be difficult. Rockett (1990) provides a more general structure where quality of the licensed technology is also negotiated. Finally, Wang (1998) has compared the licensor's payoffs under royalty and fee contracts and shows that royalty contracts strictly dominate fee contracts if the innovation is non-drastic.
In the present paper the patent holder is an outsider and the product market has leadership structure. The patent holder has three alternative licensing strategies, viz., fee, royalty and auction. In between fee and royalty contracts, royalty contract is optimal if the innovation size is quite small, and in that case transfer to both firms (leader and follower) will occur; otherwise fee contract is the equilibrium decision. In particular, if the innovation is of the intermediate level, fee licensing to leader only is optimal, and for a larger innovation, fee licensing to follower will occur. Thus not only licensee's identity becomes an important consideration, but contrary to Kamien and Tauman (1986) , royalty licensing can be an equilibrium decision. When all the licensing strategies are available, again royalty licensing to both figures in equilibrium for small innovations, and for all other cases auction dominates other modes. However, if the innovation is non-drastic, transfer to leader is optimal.
Some points may be noted. First, transfer to both firms under fee licensing is never optimal. Second, in Kamien et al. (1992) royalty is inferior to other modes of transfer. In contrary, in our paper royalty can be an equilibrium decision for low innovations. In Kamien and Tauman (2002) for non-drastic innovation royalty is superior to fee, but in our case both for drastic and non-drastic (but not too small) innovations fee dominates royalty. In the literature licensing decision is non-trivial only when the innovation is non-drastic, but in our paper when an innovation is drastic, knowing the identity of the licensee becomes crucially important. On the other hand, as in Kamien et al. (1992) , auction is the optimal decision of the patentee when the innovation is not too small.
The plan of the paper is the following. In the second section we provide the model and discuss the three licensing strategies in three consecutive subsections. The third section deals with the question of an optimal licensing strategy from the viewpoint of the patent holder. The fourth section is a conclusion. Finally, an appendix is added so as to facilitate the derivations.
Model:
We consider a three-firm structure with one inventing but non-producing firm and two other producing but non-inventing firms. The product market is characterized by Stackelberg structure, with firm 1 as leader and firm 2 follower. The market demand is linear for a homogeneous product and is given by the equation
where P is the price of the product and i q is the supply of the i-th firm, 2 , 1 = i 
Now assume that the inventing firm comes up with a patent of a cost-reducing innovation; if it is used in production, it will result in a reduction of unit cost to
. Therefore, ε is the extent of unit cost reduction, and it can be interpreted as the size of the innovation. We further assume that ε is exogenous in the model. 6 Given the size of the invention, the patent holder will now decide its optimal licensing strategy, that is, the terms of the licensing contract it will offer to a licensee. Although the competing firms have initially the same technology, but they differ in respect of their moves. This has different implications for the patent holder. Hence the patent holder will also decide whether to license its technology to leader only or to follower only or to both.
We discuss three alternative licensing strategies, viz., fee licensing, royalty licensing and auctioning (i.e., licensing by auction). Under fee licensing, the patent holder licenses its technology to the licensee(s) against a fixed fee; under royalty contract it decides the royalty rate optimally, that is the royalty per unit of output produced by the licensee(s) using the innovation. Finally, under auctioning, the innovator transfers its technology to the highest bidder (by means of the first-price auction). In the following subsections we estimate the payoffs of the innovator under different licensing contracts.
Fee Licensing
Under this strategy the patent holder first decides to whom to license the innovation, and then it gives the contract ) ; , ( ε F x . This states that the patent holder offers the technology ε against a fee to x , where 1 = x (leader only), 2 (follower only), 3 (both), and if the contract is accepted by the licensee(s), the patent holder derives a payoff, x F as fixed fee. We can then derive (see Appendix A) 
Royalty Licensing
In this case the patent holder gives the contract ) ; , ( ε 
Immediately we have the following result.
Proposition 2: When only royalty licensing strategy is available to the patent holder, if to transfer to one firm only, it is optimal to transfer to leader. If at the same time transfer to both firms is also allowed, the optimal strategy is to transfer to both firms provided that the initial unit cost of production is not very large. When the unit cost is quite large, transfer to leader only will be the optimal strategy if and only if the innovation size is large enough.
9 Consider c -a ≥ ε A comparison between fee and royalty leads to the following proposition. 
Auctioning
Under the bidding game, the maximum that a producing firm can pay to the patent holder for the licensed technology of size ε is its payoff when it gets the patent but the rival fails to get minus its payoff when the rival succeeds but it fails. So this is the maximum amount that a firm can spend on wining the patent of that 
Thus if the innovation is non-drastic, firm 1 will preempt firm 2, and in case of drastic innovation, both firms will have same incentives to win the patent. Therefore, in equilibrium firm 2 will bid ε ε ∀ Φ = ) ( Thus under auction strategy, leader will certainly get the licensed technology if the innovation is nondrastic, whereas in case of drastic innovation it gets the technology with one-half chance. This gives the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Under auction the leader will always outbid the follower and win the license if the innovation is non-drastic.

Optimal Licensing Contracts
In this section we assume that the patent holder has all the three licensing strategies available, and given the size of the innovation, it also decides optimally which firm is to be licensed. 
Under royalty contract, on the other hand, license will be given to both firms (see (10) (18)) we can write the following proposition. When the patent holder is to go for either fee or royalty licensing only, the optimal licensing strategy is summarized in the following proposition. 
Conclusion
In this paper we discuss the question of optimal licensing contract from the perspective of the inventor when the product market has Stackelberg structure. The existing literature assumes the product market to be either competitive, monopoly or simultaneous-move oligopoly. Thus we fill up a gap in the theoretical literature. Given the fact that there are many products whose markets are close to the leadership structures, our model has practical significance as well. We have assumed that the patent holder is an outsider to the product market and it has three alternative licensing strategies, viz., fee, royalty and auction. We have shown that for a small innovation the optimal strategy is royalty licensing. While for relatively large innovations fee contract dominates royalty contract, but auction is the equilibrium decision. Given asymmetry of moves in a leadership structure, the decision of the optimal contract takes into account the identity of the potential licensees. This is quite clear from the fact that under fee licensing both firms will never be transferred, while under royalty contract, which turns out to be the equilibrium decision for small sized innovations, both firms will be licensed. On the other hand, in case of auction if the innovation is non-drastic, licensing to leader is optimal, and for drastic innovations, either leader or follower is licensed. 11 We have 
